I haven’t read very much of Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits; this is probably answered somewhere in there. But why isn’t this a good argument against E=K?
(1) I know that the sun will rise tomorrow.
(2) It’s not part of my body of evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow.
(3) Therefore, I know a proposition which is not part of my body of evidence.
I think that (1) is true. Maybe some people don’t. In fact, the little bit of the book I did read suggested that Williamson may think something like this. I don’t have a copy of the book in front of me, but somewhere (I think in chapter 9), he talks about a case where I watch someone draw n marbles from a bag, and they’re all red. Intuitively, the proposition that the n+1 marble drawn is red is not part of my evidence. One reason to think this is that it seems compatible with my evidence that the n+1 marble drawn is not red. But if it was part of my evidence that the n+1 marble drawn is red, then this would not be compatible. Williamson’s explanation for why this proposition is not part of my evidence is that I do not know it. For a small n, I can buy this. But what if n is large? Can’t I come to know, by induction, that the next draw is red? This is essentially the worry I’m pressing in (1)-(3) above. It seems that it’s compatible with my evidence that the sun doesn’t rise tomorrow (this could probably be challenged). So the proposition that it will is not part of my body of evidence. But I do know it (given that it’s true). So E=K is false.
Where am I going wrong?